Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I’m pleased to hear you talk about a need to reengage with the

Iranian people. I think sometimes there is a confusion as we focus

on the comments of Ahmadinejad and his threats to destroy Israel,

and the danger of Iran having a nuclear weapon, that that’s a separate

issue from the Iranian people, as you indicated, by—even

public opinion polls say they’re still pro-American, and about 70

percent of the population of Iran is under 30, so there’s, I think,

tremendous potential there, and I hope that we provide the resource—

and I was pleased to hear the chairman say that he’d be

supportive of that—those resources that will allow us to extend our

engagement and contact with the Iranian people. I think it’s critically important.

I should also note, when I was in Dubai, I found it fascinating

that the language of choice among our diplomats seemed to be

Farsi. And the need to understand the language issue is critical.

And so, I think that’s also very positive. Engagement is absolutely critical.

Let me—I read in the paper that—the comments—or at least descriptions

of the comments of the Saudi King. And it’s been my understanding,

in dealing with the Saudis, dealing with the Egyptians,

they want us in Iraq. They don’t want us leaving Iraq. They

have deep concerns about the Iranian influence in the region. And

so, could you help me understand the perspective on the comments

of the Saudi King that describes—apparently describes—our presence

in Iraq as an illegitimate foreign occupation. Is that a—somehow,

a change in the perspective from the Saudis and others in the region?

And my concern goes not just to the nature

of our relationship with the Saudis, but I’m looking at the—one of

the things I find frustrating is that the Iranian efforts to destabilize

the region, Iranian efforts to use Hezbollah as a proxy, to

support Hamas, to, you know, provide deadly IEDs, EFPs, whatever

they’re called now—it’s not just a concern for us, but I have

always understood that the Egyptians, the Saudis, the UAE, others

within the region—particularly, by the way, Sunni governments—

have a—should have a deeper interest in supporting efforts at stability,

and I don’t see that interest. And so, I don’t see the fruits

or the action that would somehow correspond with what appears

to be a real interest. They’ve got a dog in this hunt—the Egyptians

and the Saudis and others. And so, I guess my question is, you

know: What can be done to somehow facilitate others in the

region—Sunni governments, in particular—from playing a more

active role in dealing with Iran and challenging Iran’s efforts to

destabilize and cause conflict in the region? And that’s clear—the sense I have. I would

suggest—and I think it’s pretty obvious—that the Iraqi Government

plays a role in this, that the fear among some others in the

region is that the Maliki government or—I don’t—a tool, a pawn

of Iran, but perhaps so closely aligned and not showing the kind

of resolve to deal with Iranian influence—and perhaps, obviously,

they’re not showing resolve to reconcile and deal with the Sunni-

Shia divide. And so, I would suggest, perhaps, the obvious, that the

Iraqi Government, by its own actions, in showing a commitment—

and certainly that’s the hope with this surge and changing rules

of engagement, taking on Shia extremism—will play a role in perhaps

convincing some of the others in the region that they have a

stake in stability in Iraq, and they have a stake in that government surviving.

One last question. Do you believe that we

have shut down the flow of these—the most deadly kind, now, of

IEDs? I think they’re called EFPs, but—and I—when I was in Iraq,

I had discussion with our troops and the ability of shooting projectiles

from the side, with devastating impact—if we know they’re

coming from Iran, they’re killing American and coalition forces,

have we shut it down? And, if not, what else do we have to do to shut it down?

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.